Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and  Good Corporate Citizenship by Simons, Michael A.
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 76 
Number 4 Volume 76, Fall 2002, Number 4 Article 13 
February 2012 
Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate 
Citizenship" 
Michael A. Simons 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Simons, Michael A. (2002) "Vicarious Snitching: Crime, Cooperation, and "Good Corporate Citizenship"," 
St. John's Law Review: Vol. 76 : No. 4 , Article 13. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol76/iss4/13 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
VICARIOUS SNITCHING: CRIME,
COOPERATION, AND "GOOD CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP"
MICHAEL A. SIMONSt
INTRODUCTION
Snitching-or, more euphemistically, "cooperation"-has a
long history in our criminal justice system.' Judicial leniency
for cooperators traces its roots back hundreds of years to the
common law practice of approvement,2  and American
prosecutors have been striking deals with cooperators since at
least the nineteenth century.3 Over the past fifteen years,
however, federal criminal prosecutions have undergone what
can fairly be characterized as a cooperation revolution. Ever
since the advent of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in 1987,4
t Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; Fellow,
Vincentian Center for Church and Society. I owe thanks to Michael Perino for
encouragement and helpful discussions, to Keith Sambur and Kareem Vessup for
able research assistance, and to the Summer Research Program at St. John's for
financial assistance.
1 See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 1999)
(noting the "longstanding [common law] practice sanctioning the testimony of
accomplices against their confederates in exchange for leniency"); United States v.
Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987) ("No practice is more
ingrained in our criminal justice system....").
2 See Rex v. Rudd, 98 Eng. Rep. 1114, 1116 (K.B. 1775) (describing an ancient
practice then in disuse).
3 See The Whiskey Cases, 99 U.S. 603 (1878) (approving the practice and
describing it as commonplace). For discussions of the history of cooperation, see
George Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28
PEPP. L. REV. 1, 13-16 (2000); Graham Hughes, Agreements for Cooperation in
Criminal Cases, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1992).
4 The United States Sentencing Guidelines were created in response to the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, see Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-59, 3561-66, 3571-74, 3581-86, & 28
U.S.C. §§ 991-98), and apply to all federal crimes committed after November 1,
1987. See Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
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defendants have increasingly seen cooperation as their best
chance to avoid a stiff prison sentence, and prosecutors have
increasingly relied on cooperators to make cases. 5
This cooperation revolution has not been limited to
individual defendants. With increasing frequency, prosecutors
are demanding that corporations act as "good corporate
citizens"-which, to prosecutors, means cooperating fully in any
investigation. 6 Prosecutors are well positioned to make such
demands: corporations have broad responsibility for crimes
committed by their employees, prosecutors have nearly
unrestrained discretion to bring charges against corporations,
and the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines specifically
reward cooperation (and punish its absence).7 Thus, it is not
surprising that many corporations facing an investigation have
acceded to prosecutors' demands for cooperation.8 Indeed, if a
223, 228 (1993). Cooperation has also been spurred on by legislatively mandated
minimum sentences, which, like the Sentencing Guidelines, restrict judicial
discretion and increase sentence severity. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking
Mandatory Minimums, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 199, 203 (1993).
5 In 2001, approximately seventeen percent of federal defendants received a
sentence reduction for cooperating. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION,
2001 SOURCEBOOK OF SENTENCING STATISTICS [hereinafter "2001 SOURCEBOOK"],
at Tbl. 26. Many more defendants offer to cooperate, but are rebuffed by
prosecutors. See Michael A. Simons, Departing Ways: Uniformity, Disparity, and
Cooperation in Federal Drug Sentences, 47 VILL. L. REV. 921, 953 (2002). For a
more detailed discussion of the incentives created by the Guidelines and how those
incentives have affected cooperation rates in federal court over the past fifteen
years, see id. at 931-38.
6 See William S. Laufer, Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading
of Favors, 87 IOwA L. REV. 643, 653 (2002) ("Every year following passage of the
Sentencing Guidelines, there has been a noticeable escalation in prosecutorial
expectations of organizational cooperation.").
7 See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL
[hereinafter U.S.S.G.] § 8C2.5(g) (2000). The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
apply to all federal crimes committed by organizations after November 1, 1991. Id.
at ch. 8. For an introduction to the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, see Ilene
H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines for
Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some Thoughts
About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205 (1993).
8 See, e.g., David M. Zornow & Keith D. Krakaur, On The Brink of a Brave
New World: The Death of Privilege in Corporate Criminal Investigations, 37 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 147, 153-58 (2000) (describing increasing prosecutorial demands for
corporate cooperation and corresponding corporate acquiescence); see also Elkan
Abramowitz & Barry A. Bohrer, Mary Jo White's Legacy, 227 N.Y.L.J. 5 (2002)
(noting that "in recent years" it has become a "routine defense strategy for
corporations to alert the government at the earliest hint of wrongdoing within the
corporation to mitigate their own criminal exposure").
THE COOPERATION REVOLUTION
corporation can prove its "good corporate citizenship" by
cooperating, it may be able to avoid indictment altogether.
That is not to say that the decision about whether to
cooperate is an easy one, for prosecutorial demands for
cooperation can place a corporation (or, more accurately, its
officers and directors) in an extraordinarily difficult position.
On the one hand, the cost of cooperating can be significant: the
cooperating corporation may be required to terminate
employees, disclose confidential documents, and waive
privileges-all of which may expose the corporation to
substantial civil liability. On the other hand, the cost of not
cooperating can be even more devastating. While Arthur
Andersen may have been doomed from the moment it began
shredding documents, the accounting firm's fate was largely
sealed when, after not fully cooperating, it was indicted for
obstruction of justice. 9
This Article will examine corporate cooperation and the
difficulties it can create for corporate decision-makers. 10 Part I
describes the principles of vicarious guilt that give prosecutors
the power to demand corporate cooperation. Part II examines
how prosecutors exercise their discretion in deciding whether to
charge corporations with crimes. In Part III, the Article
examines the cooperators. Just as a corporation's guilt is only
vicarious, so too its cooperation can be only vicarious. In the
end, it is not the corporation that cooperates, but its officers and
9 See Lynn Cowan & Cheryl Winokur Munk, Andersen: Called to Account:
Criminal Charges Threaten Auditor's Survival, WALL ST. J., Mar. 18, 2002, at C15
("If you are a bettor, the odds [do not] look good for Arthur Andersen LLP's
survival: In the past two decades, no financial-services firm has remained in
business after facing criminal charges."). In plea negotiations with prosecutors on
the eve of its indictment, Arthur Andersen's lawyer argued that criminal charges
meant "[d]eath, death, death" for the firm. See Flynn McRoberts et al., Repeat
Offender Gets Stiff Justice, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 2002, at 1.
10 In discussing these issues, I focus on federal prosecutions for several
reasons: (1) federal law provides for much broader corporate criminal liability than
the law of many states; (2) most prosecutions of large corporations take place in
federal court; and (3) the recent spate of corporate scandals-from Enron and
Andersen to Adelphia and WorldCom-have resulted in federal prosecutions (or
calls for federal prosecutions). That is not to say that some state prosecutors-most
notably New York County District Attorney Robert Morgenthau-do not also
target corporations. See, e.g., Gary Silverman, Man in the News-Wall Street's
Scourge-Man in the News Robert Morgenthau, FIN. TIMES, June 8, 2002, at 13; see
also Sharon Walsh, Robert Morgenthau: The Bulldog on BCCI's Trail, WASH. POST,
Mar. 14, 1993, at H1.
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directors-the men and women who make decisions for the
corporation. For these vicarious snitches, the process can be a
minefield, filled with conflicting loyalties and inevitable self-
interest.
I. VICARIoUs GUILT
Corporations don't commit crimes; people do. But when the
people committing crimes are corporate employees, the
corporation will often be just as guilty as the employee."
It was not always so. Until the twentieth century,
American courts followed the common law rule that a
corporation could not be guilty of a crime, because it was an
artificial entity that could not act with mens rea.12 As one
nineteenth century Chancellor of England put it, "'How can you
ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has no
soul to be damned and no body to be kicked?' "13 By the dawn of
the twentieth century, however, American courts had begun
chipping away at the common law rule, holding corporations
11 See Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate
Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227, 1247 (1979)
[hereinafter Developments] (defining scope of corporate criminal liability); see also
Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1102-05 (1991) (describing current standards of
corporate criminal liability). Organizational liability is not, of course, limited to
corporations. Partnerships, associations, and other organizational entities can also
be criminally responsible for the actions of their agents. See RICHARD S. GRUNER,
CORPORATE CRIMES AND SENTENCING (2d ed. 1997).
12 Blackstone, writing in 1765, saw little need to elaborate on the well-settled
common law rule: "A corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime,
in its corporate capacity." 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 464; see also Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25
THE J. OF LEGAL STUD. 319, 333 (1996) ("Blackstone treated the point as so obvious
it needed no elaboration. How could anybody think differently?"). For a general
historical examination of vicarious corporate guilt, see Kathleen F. Brickey,
Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an Observation, 60 WASH.
U. L.Q. 393 (1982).
13 John C. Coffee, Jr., Making the Punishment Fit the Corporation: The
Problems of Finding an Optimal Corporation Criminal Sanction, 1 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 3, 4 (1980) (quoting Edward, First Baron of Thurlow, Land Chancellor of
England). As Kathleen Brickey explains
The corporation was recognized in law not as a natural person, but as an
artificial entity. As an abstraction, it lacked physical, mental, and moral
capacity to engage in wrongful conduct, or to suffer punishment. It could
neither commit criminal acts, entertain criminal intent, nor suffer
imprisonment. It had no soul, and so could not be blamed.
Brickey, supra note 12, at 396.
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responsible for strict liability offenses involving failure to
perform statutory duties. 14 Then, in 1909, in New York Central
& Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States,15 the Supreme
Court inaugurated the modern era of corporate criminal
responsibility.
In New York Central, a railroad employee-the assistant
freight traffic manager-had been charged with violating the
Elkins Act by giving a customer "rebates" on government-fixed
shipping rates. The railroad had also been charged because the
statute provided that that the act of an employee "'within the
scope of his employment'" was "'deemed to be the act'" of the
employer. 16 The railroad argued that it could not be convicted of
a crime, if not because it could not form the necessary intent,
then at least because the criminal intent of a mid-level
employee could not be imputed to the individuals who ran the
company (its board of directors) or to the individuals who owned
the company (its stockholders).17 The Court, however, rejected
the common law view of corporate intent in favor of a
respondeat superior theory borrowed from tort law.' 8
The tort principles adopted in New York Central have
governed corporate criminal liability ever since. A corporation
is criminally responsible for "the acts of any of its agents if an
agent (1) commits a crime (2) within the scope of employment
(3) with the intent to benefit the corporation."19 This vicarious
14 See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 12, at 333 & n.22 (citing Commonwealth v.
Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. 339 (1854)); see also Shaun P. Martin,
Intracorporate Conspiracies, 50 STAN. L. REV. 399, 406 & n.48 (1998) (citing State
v. Morris & Essex R.R. Co., 23 N.J.L. 360, 364 (1852).
15 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
16 Id. at 491-92 (quoting the Elkins Act, 32 Stat. 847, Pub. L. No. 107-223, ch.
708 (1903)).
17 Id. at 492.
18 Id. at 494 ("Applying the principles governing civil liability, we go only a
step farther in holding that the act of the agent, while exercising the authority
delegated to him to make rates for transportation, may be controlled, in the
interest of public policy, by imputing his act to his employer and imposing
penalties upon the corporation for which he is acting.. ").
19 See Developments, supra note 11, at 1247; see also N.Y. Central, 212 U.S. at
493 (noting that "the liability is not imputed because the principal actually
participates in the malice or fraud, but because the act is done for the benefit of the
principal, while the agent is acting within the scope of his employment in the
business of the principal."). The American rule of vicarious corporate guilt is
"considerably broader than in most other countries." See V.S. Khanna, Corporate
Liability Standards: When Should Corporations Be Held Criminally Liable?, 37
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1239, 1243 (2000); see also Jeffrey S. Parker, Doctrine for
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corporate guilt is extraordinarily broad. Indeed, as one
commentator has noted, courts so rarely find an employee's
conduct to be outside the scope of employment or without an
intent to benefit the corporation that a corporation will be
vicariously guilty whenever an agent "commits a crime related
in almost any way to the agent's employment."20  Thus,
corporations have been found guilty when criminal acts are
performed by low-level employees, 21 when the specific criminal
acts are unauthorized, 22 when the criminal acts are against the
corporation's specific instructions, 23  when the corporation
actively sought to prevent the crime, 24 when the corporation did
not actually benefit from the crime,25 and when no one in the
Destruction: The Case of Corporate Criminal Liability, 17 MANAGERIAL &
DEcISION ECON. 381, 382 (1996) (noting "[t]hat the United States virtually stands
alone in the world on its approach to" corporate criminal liability).
20 Bucy, supra note 11, at 1148-49 (noting also that a corporation will be
guilty of an employee's crime so long as the employee was "carrying out a job
related activity" and the corporation was not "the intended victim of the illegality"
(internal quotations omitted)); see also Developments, supra note 11, at 1250
(noting that the "scope of employment" requirement means "little more than that
the act occurred while the offending employee was carrying out a job-related
activity"). See generally H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director's Compliance
Oversight Responsibility in the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 73-77
(2001) (summarizing the breadth of corporate criminal liability).
21 See Brown, supra note 20, at 74 & n.332 (citing United States v. Bank of
New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir. 1987)) (bank teller); Texas-Oklahoma
Express, Inc. v. United States, 429 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970) (truck stop workers);
Boise Dodge, Inc. v. United States, 406 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969) (automobile
dealership employees)).
22 See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481,
493-94 (1909) ("A corporation is held responsible for acts not within the agent's
corporate powers strictly construed, but which the agent has assumed to perform
for the corporation when employing the corporate powers actually authorized, and
in such cases there need be no written authority under seal or vote of the
corporation in order to constitute the agency or to authorize the act."); see also
Brown, supra note 20, at 75 & n.335.
23 See, e.g., United States v. Automated Med. Labs., 770 F.2d 399, 407 (4th
Cir. 1985) (stating that although employees' conduct was "contrary to corporate
policy" this does not "absolve [a corporation] of legal responsibility for their acts");
United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding
corporation guilty even though offending employee's conduct was contrary to
corporate policy and against the express instructions of employee's supervisors);
see also Brown, supra note 20, at 74 & n.335; Bucy, supra note 11, at 1102 & n.21.
24 See Brown, supra note 20, at 74-75 & n.335 (citing numerous cases holding
that "corporate policies of compliance provide no shelter from vicarious criminal
liability"); see also KATHLEEN BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 3.02
(1984); Bucy, supra note 11, at 1102 & n.21.
25 See, e.g., Automated Med. Labs., 770 F.2d at 407 ("[Ilt is not necessary for
[Vol.76:979
THE COOPERATION REVOLUTION
corporation (other than the perpetrator) knew about the crime
at the time of its commission.26
The breadth of this vicarious organizational guilt has been
roundly criticized. Some have criticized as misguided any effort
to anthropomorphize artificial entities, particularly because
they cannot act with a mens rea.27 Others have argued that
criminal liability is an inefficient alternative to civil regulation
and civil liability.28 Still others have argued that corporate
criminal liability undercuts respect for the criminal law by
divorcing criminal liability from individual moral
responsibility.29
Notwithstanding these criticisms, vicarious organizational
guilt has survived nearly unchanged since 1909-at least in
an agent's actions to have actually benefited the corporate entity."); see also
BRICKEY, supra note 24, § 4.02 (1984); Bucy, supra note 11, at 1102-03 & n.22.
26 See BRICKEY, supra note 24, § 4.02 (1984); Bucy, supra note 11, at 1102 &
n.22. For a good example of the breadth of corporate vicarious guilt, see United
States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 572 (1983) (upholding corporation's
conviction for bid rigging even though bid rigging was done by "two relatively
minor officials ... without the knowledge of high level corporate officers[J,]" and in
violation of the corporation's "longstanding, well known, and strictly enforced
policy against bid rigging"); see also Pamela H. Bucy, Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines: The Cart Before the Horse, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 329, 335 (1992).
27 The classic statement of this view came from Gerhard O.W. Mueller almost
fifty years ago:
Many weeds have grown on the acre of jurisprudence which has been
allotted to the criminal law. Among these weeds is a hybrid of vicarious
liability, absolute liability, an inkling of mens rea-though a rather
degenerated mens rea-, a few genes from tort law and a few from the law
of business associations. This weed is called corporate criminal liability....
Nobody bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it. It just grew.
Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation: A Study of the Model Penal
Code Position on Corporate Criminal Liability, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 21 (1957-
1958) (arguing also that the law of corporate criminal liability "has proceeded
without any rationale whatsoever").
28 See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 12, at 334; V.S. Khanna, Corporate
Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996).
29 See Parker, supra note 19, at 381 ("The very idea of 'corporate crime' is a
corruption of the core meaning of crime and a dilution of the underlying ethic of
individual moral responsibility and autonomy."); see also Bucy, supra note 11, at
1099-1100 (arguing that allowing criminal convictions "without proof of the
corporation's intent" encourages "the blurring of criminal and civil liability," which
"dilutes the impact of a criminal conviction, and, ultimately, erodes the power of
the criminal law"). Corporate criminal liability, however, does have its defenders.
See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 833, 856 (2000) (arguing that the moral condemnation
accompanying a corporate criminal conviction sends an important retributive
message about corporate misconduct).
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theory. In practice, though, vicarious organizational guilt is not
nearly so broad. It has been limited not by statute or by case
law, but rather by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. 30
There is little doubt that corporate crime abounds and that
prosecutors do not lack for corporate targets.31  Of the
thousands of individuals prosecuted each year for white-collar
crimes, it is safe to assume that many were corporate employees
and were motivated at least in part by an intent to benefit the
corporation.32  Yet corporations-particularly large public
corporations-are prosecuted quite infrequently. 33 Armed with
30 As William Laufer has observed, since 1909, corporations have resorted to
numerous strategies to minimize the risks of criminal prosecution, including
fidelity insurance, derivative suits, and, more recently, compliance programs. See
William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of
Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1356-57 (1999). None of these strategies,
however, immunize corporations from prosecution, they simply made some
corporations less attractive targets for prosecutors. As Laufer recognizes, the rule
of vicarious guilt has remained unchanged. See id. at 1357 ("For nearly a century,
during many shifts of liability risk, courts and legislatures have embraced
enforcement strategies, both implicit and explicit, but only one liability rule:
vicarious liability."). Like these corporate risk-shifting strategies, the Organization
Sentencing Guidelines have also indirectly limited corporate prosecutions by
making some corporations less attractive targets. See infra note 65 and
accompanying text. Since the underlying vicarious liability rule has not changed, it
is the prosecutors who decide which corporations should be prosecuted. See Laufer,
supra note 6, at 647 ("In theory, the substantive corporate criminal law is ruled by
principles of vicarious liability that stretch back to rules articulated in New York
Central & Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States. In practice, cases of
corporate crime are adjudicated by a brand of negotiated compliance.").
31 In 2001, over 12,500 defendants were sentenced for what the Sentencing
Commission considers to be "white-collar" offenses. See 2001 SOURCEBOOK, supra
note 5, at Fig. A, Tbl. 3. The Commission does not provide data on how many of
these offenses were related to the offender's employment.
32 For example, in just the last few months, former executives of Rite Aid,
WorldCom, and Enron have pleaded guilty to fraudulently inflating their
company's income, yet none of the corporations has been charged. See Rite Aid's
Former President Pleads Guilty, WALL ST. J., July, 11, 2002, at B4; Deborah
Solomon, WorldCom's Ex-Controller Pleads Guilty to Fraud, WALL ST. J., Sept. 27,
2002, at A3; Jonathan Weiletal, Guilty Plea by Enron's Kopper Increases Scrutiny
of Ex-CFO, WALL ST. J., Aug. 22, 2002, at Al.
33 Organizational prosecutions have gradually increased-from 111 in 1995 to
238 in 2001. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1995 ANNUAL REPORT,
at Tbl. 47; 2001 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at Tbl. 51. Those prosecutions,
however, are only a tiny fraction of all federal cases. In 2001, the 238
organizational prosecutions were only one-half of one percent of all federal
prosecutions. See 2001 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 5, at Tbls. 3, 51. Moreover, the
vast majority of organizational defendants are small, privately held corporations.
One study indicated that over a five-year period in the 1990s, ninety-six percent of
all organizations sentenced in federal court had fewer than fifty employees and
[Vol.76:979
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a broad liability rule and facing no shortage of targets, why is it
that prosecutors so rarely indict corporations? Put another way,
if vicarious organizational guilt is limited only by prosecutorial
discretion, what principles, if any, guide the exercise of that
discretion?
II. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND GOOD CORPORATE
CITIZENSHIP
On one level, prosecutors decide whether to charge a
corporation in the same way they decide whether to charge an
individual: they weigh the seriousness of the harm and the
culpability of the offender against the resources required for the
prosecution.34 But on another level, a corporation's artificial
nature makes the prosecution decision very different.
The most obvious difference is in the available sanctions.
With "no body to be kicked," a corporation cannot be
imprisoned. Prosecutors are accustomed to gauging the
seriousness of a crime (and, thus, the importance of their work)
by the amount of imprisonment that results.35 Prosecutors are
also keenly aware of the unique expressive power of
were privately held. See William S. Laufer, A Study of Small Business Compliance
Practices, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND SYMPOSIUM OF CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN THE' UNITED STATES, CORPORATE CRIME IN AMERICA:
STRENGTHENING THE "GOOD CITIZEN" CORPORATION 135, 135 (Sept. 7-8, 1995)
[hereinafter PROCEEDINGS]. Sentencing Commission data confirm the paucity of
public companies who are actually prosecuted. For example, in 1997, of the 220
organizations prosecuted in federal court, only four were publicly traded. See
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT 40.
34 Department of Justice guidelines list seven factors that prosecutors should
consider in deciding whether or not to bring charges against individuals:
1. Federal law enforcement priorities;
2. The nature and seriousness of the offense;
3. The deterrent effect of prosecution;
4. The person's culpability in connection with the offense;
5. The person's history with respect to criminal activity;
6. The person's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or
prosecution of others; and
7. The probable sentence or other consequences if the person is
convicted.
Principles of Federal Prosecution, in THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE MANUAL, U.S.
ATTORNEY'S MANUAL § 9-27.230 (2d ed. 2000).
35 See id. § 9-27.230(B)(8) ("In assessing the strength of the Federal interest in
prosecution .... [federal prosecutors should consider] the sentence, or other
consequence, that is likely to be imposed if prosecution is successful, and whether
such a sentence or other consequence would justify the time and effort of
prosecution.").
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imprisonment-it conveys moral condemnation far more
effectively then any fine. 36 Thus, it is not surprising that
prosecutors prefer individuals as targets. Moreover, because
corporate guilt is only vicarious, prosecutors who are
considering charging a corporation usually have already
identified the individual wrongdoers who actually committed
the crimes. Thus, the relevant question for prosecutors is not
simply whether the corporation should be charged, but rather
whether it is necessary to charge the corporation in addition to
the individual wrongdoers. 37
For this reason, a prosecutor's focus is less likely to be on
the seriousness of the harm (which can be accounted for in
prosecuting the individuals) and more likely to be on the
corporation's culpability-in particular, the extent to which the
corporation is culpable separate and apart from the individual
offenders. With "no soul to be damned," however, a corporation
itself is hard to blame. As a proxy, prosecutors typically look for
36 See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 591, 621, 650, 652-53 (1996) (arguing that fines are not as effective as
imprisonment because fines do not express moral condemnation). Legislators are
also keenly aware of the expressive power of imprisonment. For example, when
debating and passing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress (and the media)
focused on those provisions that increased maximum prison sentences for corporate
executives, not those provisions that increased maximum fines for organizations.
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, §§ 802, 807, 116 Stat. 745,
800, 804 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519, 1348(2)); Michael A. Perino, Enron's
Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deterrence Aspects of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, 76 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 671 (2002) (describing the Act). The
recently staged "perp walks" of some corporate defendants, including the
executives of Adelphia and WorldCom, are an obvious-if somewhat coarse-
example of the politics behind white-collar prosecutions. See Howard Fineman &
Michael Isikoff, Laying Down the Law, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 5, 2002, at 20 (describing
White House involvement in arranging the very public arrest of top executives of
Adelphia Communications); Anne Gearon, Arrest Spectacle, A Bone for the Public,
PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Aug. 2, 2002, at C12 (discussing the "perp walk[s]" of
Adelphia and WorldCom executives and quoting one white-collar defense lawyer as
stating, "[y]ou get a better headline by dragging somebody into custody in
handcuffs than by indicting a faceless corporation").
37 It is possible, under the doctrine of collective knowledge, for a corporation to
be guilty of a crime even though no one individual possessed all the knowledge
necessary to satisfy the requisite criminal mental state. See United States v. Bank
of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 856 (1st Cir. 1987) (" '[A] corporation cannot plead
innocence by asserting that the information obtained by several employees was not
acquired by any one individual who then would have comprehended its full import.
Rather the corporation is considered to have acquired the collective knowledge of
its employees and is held responsible for their failure to act accordingly.'" (quoting
United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738 (W.D. Va. 1974))).
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a corporation's soul in the conduct of its top managers. But
until relatively recently, the factors that prosecutors use to
gauge a corporation's culpability revealed themselves only
through the various (and sometimes inconsistent) ways in which
prosecutors exercised their discretion. Two events in the 1990s,
however, brought these factors into the limelight: the
promulgation in 1991 of the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines,38 and the publication in 1999 of Department of
Justice guidelines for charging organizations. 39
A. The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
After a decade-long effort to reform federal sentencing,
Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which
abolished parole, established the United States Sentencing
Commission, and charged the Commission with creating
binding rules to govern criminal sentences in federal court. 40
The resulting Sentencing Guidelines, which first took effect in
1987, have revolutionized federal sentencing. For white-collar
offenders, the changes are particularly striking: sentences have
become more severe (often involving imprisonment)41 and judges
are generally prohibited from considering a host of personal
factors (such as age, education, employment, family
background, family responsibilities, charitable works, and
public service) that typically benefited white-collar offenders. 42
38 See U.S.S.G., ch 8.
39 U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Prosecution of Corporations (June 16, 1999)
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/Chargingcorps.html.
40 See Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-59, 3561-66, 3571-74, 3581-86 & 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98. The reform effort
that resulted in the Sentencing Reform Act usually traces its roots to Judge
Marvin Frankel's influential 1973 book Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order.
For a detailed discussion of the legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act,
see Stith & Koh, supra note 4.
41 Although the Guidelines were not generally designed to increase sentence
severity, the Sentencing Commission did make a conscious choice to increase
sentence severity for white-collar offenses. See U.S.S.G., ch. 1, pt.A(3) (2001) (noting
the Commission's conclusion that economic crime in the pre-Guidelines era had
been punished "less severely than other apparently equivalent behavior"); Stephen
Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1988) (discussing "the Commission's
decision to increase the severity of punishment for white-collar crime" by requiring
imprisonment "for many white-collar offenders, including tax, insider trading, and
antitrust offenders, who previously would have likely received only probation").
42 In pre-Guidelines sentencing, judges routinely considered such factors in
sentencing white-collar offenders. See STANTON WHEELER ET AL, SITTING IN
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This sentencing revolution did not reach corporations until
1991, when the Commission adopted the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines. 43 Like the Sentencing Guidelines for
individuals, the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines were
designed to restrict judicial discretion in the sentencing of
organizations and, for the most part, to make corporate
sentences more severe.
44
Under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, a
corporation's sentence-like an individual's sentence-is "based
on the seriousness of the offense and the culpability of the
organization."45 The seriousness of the offense is typically
determined either by the economic impact of the crime (i.e., the
loss to the victim or the gain to the offender) or by reference to
the "offense levels" in the individual sentencing guidelines.46
JUDGMENT: THE SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 88-92, 102-05 (1988).
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, such "factors are not ordinarily relevant to the
determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline
range." U.S.S.G., ch. 5, pt. H (2001). Judges may still consider those factors in
deciding what sentence to impose within the relatively narrow Guidelines
sentencing range. In addition, sentencing judges may rely on those factors to
depart from the Guidelines sentencing range when such factors are present "to an
exceptional degree." See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996).
43 For descriptions of the development of the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines, see Nagel & Swenson, supra note 7; Richard S. Gruner, Towards an
Organizational Jurisprudence: Transforming Corporate Criminal Law Through
Federal Sentencing Reform, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 407, 411-14 (1994).
44 See Jeffrey S. Parker, Rules Without ... Some Critical Reflections on the
Federal Corporate Sentencing Guidelines, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 397, 424 (1993) (noting
that the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines represent a "ten to twenty-fold
increase in the general level" of corporate criminal penalties).
45 U.S.S.G., ch. 8, Introductory Commentary (2001). The Commission initially
proposed Guidelines based on an "optimal penalty" approach that eschewed any
attempt to account for corporate culpability. Under this explicitly economic
deterrence-based approach:
organizational fines were to be set by measuring the losses flowing from
an offense, adding to that amount the incremental cost of detecting the
violation, multiplying this sum by a factor reflecting the difficulty of
detecting and prosecuting that type of offense, and adding a further
amount equal to the cost of prosecuting and sentencing the defendant.
Gruner, supra note 43, at 412; see also Michael K Block, Optimal Penalties,
Criminal Law and the Control of Corporate Behavior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395, 397-410
(1991) (defending the optimal penalties approach). Under the significant influence
of the Department of Justice, this proposal was eventually replaced by one that
followed the same basic approach as the guidelines for individuals. See Jeffrey S.
Parker, The Current Corporate Sentencing Proposals: History and Critique, 3 FED.
SENT. REP. 133, 134 (1990).
46 See U.S.S.G. §§ 8A1.2(b)(2), 8C2.4(a). Other provisions govern the fine when
the corporation cannot pay any fine. See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.2(b), and when the
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This calculation will yield the corporation's "base fine,"47 which
is then adjusted up or down based upon the corporation's
"culpability score."48 The culpability score is determined by a
mathematical calculation based on the following factors: (1)
whether the organization's top management "participated in,
condoned, or was willfully ignorant of the offense";49 (2) whether
"tolerance" of the offense by middle management was "pervasive
throughout the organization";50 (3) whether the organization
has a history of criminal convictions or regulatory violations;5'
(4) whether the organization obstructed justice or violated
specific court orders;5 2 (5) whether the organization had in place
"an effective program to prevent and detect violations of law";5 3
(6) whether the organization reported the offense prior to any
imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation;54 (7)
whether the organization "fully cooperated in the
investigation";55  and (8) whether the organization
"demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of
responsibility for its criminal conduct."5 6 A corporation with a
corporation is "operated primarily for a criminal purpose" or "primarily by criminal
means." U.S.S.G. § 8C1.1.
47 The guidelines provide base fines ranging from a low of $5,000 (for an
offense level of 6 or less) to a high of $72,500,000 (for an offense level of 38 or
more). See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.4(d). If the loss or gain from the offense is greater than
the fine resulting from the offense level, the loss or gain will then be the base fine.
See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.4(a).
48 See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5.
49 See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(b). This provision applies to "[high-level personnel,"
which the Guidelines define as "individuals who have substantial control over the
organization or who have a substantial role in the making of policy within the
organization," including "a director; an executive officer; an individual in charge of
a major business or functional unit of the organization, such as sales,
administration, or finance; and an individual with a substantial ownership
interest." U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, cmt. n.3(b). The larger the organization, the more
significant will be the involvement of top management. See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(b).
50 See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(b). This provision includes tolerance by "[s]ubstantial
authority personnel," which is defined to include "individuals who within the scope
of their authority exercise a substantial measure of discretion in acting on behalf of
an organization." U.S.S.G. § 8A1.2, cmt. n.3(c). Examples include plant managers,
sales managers, and individuals with the authority to set prices or negotiate
significant contracts. See id.
51 See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(c).
52 See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(d)-(e).
53 U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(f).
54 See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)(1).
55 See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)(2).
56 See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.5(g)(3).
20021
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
high culpability score could see its fine increased by up to 400%,
while a corporation with a low culpability score could see its fine
cut by up to 95%.57
While the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines are
directed at judges' sentencing decisions-not prosecutors'
charging decisions-they inevitably affect how prosecutors view
potential targets. 58 Moreover, and more to the point, the factors
that enter into the Guidelines' culpability score are largely
consistent with those factors that prosecutors use to evaluate
corporate culpability.
B. DOJ's "Federal Prosecution of Corporations"
In 1980, the Department of Justice promulgated the
Principles of Federal Prosecution, a comprehensive, if somewhat
vague, set of guidelines for federal prosecutors' charging
decisions. 59 The Principles, however, are silent about the
prosecution of organizations. 60 It was not until 1999 that the
Department formulated separate principles to guide prosecutors
in deciding whether to charge a corporation. 61
The policy statement-entitled Federal Prosecutions of
Corporations-codifies in a non-binding way a set of principles
and practices that prosecutors around the country had been
57 See U.S.S.G. § 8C2.6.
58 While the liability rule may determine whether an offender can be charged,
it is the sentencing rule that often determines whether an offender will be charged.
See supra note 35; see also Laufer, supra note 6, at 646 (describing the
Organizational Sentencing Guidelines as a "decision template for
prosecutors ... in cases of corporate crime").
59 See Principles of Federal Prosecution, supra note 34. For a more detailed
discussion of the Principles of Federal Prosecution, see Michael A. Simons,
Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling
Federalization, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 934 (2000).
60 See Audrey Strauss, Exercise of Discretion in Prosecuting Corporations,
N.Y.L.J. 5, 5 (1998) (noting that most of the Principles of Federal Prosecution do
not support the prosecution of corporations and arguing that the DOJ should
promulgate separate guidelines for corporate prosecutions).
61 See Federal Prosecution of Corporations, supra note 39. There has been
some dispute over whether the corporate prosecution guidelines were meant to be
public. See Mark F. Pomerantz, Prosecuting Corporations: Applying the New
Department of Justice Guidelines, 224 N.Y.L.J. 9, 9 (2000) (reporting Assistant
Attorney General's denials that policy statement was not intended to be released);
Audrey Strauss, New Justice Department Factors on Corporate Prosecution, 223
N.Y.L.J. 5, 5 (2000) (noting that the policy statement was issued on June 16, 1999,
but was not made public until December 1999 "following a leak to BNA").
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developing ad hoc through the 1990s. 62 With respect to charging
decisions, the policy statement first notes that prosecutors
contemplating charging corporations should "weigh all of the
factors normally considered in the sound exercise of
prosecutorial judgment: the sufficiency of the evidence, the
likelihood of success at trial, the probable deterrent,
rehabilitative and other consequences of conviction, and the
adequacy of non-criminal approaches."63 The policy statement
then lists eight specific factors prosecutors should consider in
deciding whether to charge corporations:
1. The nature and seriousness of the offense, including the
risk of harm to the public, and applicable policies and
priorities, if any, governing the prosecution of corporations for
particular categories of crime;
2. The pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation,
including the complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing
by corporate management;
3. The corporation's history of similar conduct, including prior
criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it;
4. The corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of
wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate in the
investigation of its agents, including, if necessary, the waiver
of the corporate attorney-client and work product privileges;
5. The existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance
program;
6. The corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts to
implement an effective corporate compliance program or to
improve an existing one, to replace responsible management,
62 Although the policy statement was created by a working group of federal
prosecutors from around the country, it appears as if the Southern District of New
York played a leading role in the formulation of the document. For one, the cover
memo that accompanied the document when it was distributed to all United States
Attorneys indicated that comments about the guidelines should be sent to the
Deputy United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. Moreover,
the guidelines substantially reflect corporate prosecution policies that had been
adopted and applied by the U.S. Attorney's Office in the Southern District of New
York throughout the 1990s. See Strauss, supra note 61, at 5 (observing that
although the policy statement's authors are not identified, "it is apparent that the
U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York had a leadership role
in the creation of the policy" because "many of the practices of that district are
included in the policy").
63 Federal Prosecution of Corporations, supra note 39, at II.A.
20021
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
to discipline or terminate wrongdoers, to pay restitution, and
to cooperate with the relevant government agencies
7. Collateral consequences, including disproportionate harm to
shareholders and employees not proven personally culpable;
and
8. The adequacy of non-criminal remedies, such as civil or
regulatory enforcement actions.64
Among these factors, perhaps the most important are those
that involve the corporation's conduct after the wrongdoing is
discovered. While the "nature and seriousness of the offense" is
no doubt important, it tells the prosecutor little about whether
the corporation-as opposed to the individual wrongdoers-
should be punished. Instead, prosecutors will often put great
weight on the corporate response to the wrongdoing, in
particular whether the corporation fully cooperates with the
government's investigation and prosecution of the individual
wrongdoers. 65
From the prosecutors' perspective, a corporation's
cooperation (or lack of cooperation) becomes a proxy for the
corporation's character-a window, if you will, into the
corporation's soul. Few prosecutors view an individual
defendant's cooperation as an indication that the defendant has
changed his ways.66 Corporations, however, can change their
64 Id. (internal cross-references omitted). Several of these factors are not
unique to corporations. In deciding whether to prosecute individuals, prosecutors
certainly look to the nature and seriousness of the offense, the individual's criminal
history, collateral consequences of a conviction, and the adequacy of non-criminal
remedies. See Principles of Federal Prosecution, supra note 34, §§ 9-27.230, 9-
27.250.
65 The DOJ policy statement is explicit in this respect:
In determining whether to charge a corporation, that corporation's timely
and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate
with the government's investigation may be relevant factors. In gauging
the extent of the corporation's cooperation, the prosecutor may consider
the corporation's willingness to identify the culprits within the
corporation, including senior executives, to make witnesses available, to
disclose the complete results of its internal investigation, and to waive the
attorney-client and work product privileges.
Federal Prosecution of Corporations, supra note 39, at VI.A.
66 See, e.g., Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 82
(1995) ("The assumption that defendants' reasons for cooperating are exclusively
selfish seems reasonable enough ... ."); Ian Weinstein, Regulating the Market for
Snitches, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 563, 624 (1999) (noting that the cooperator "is
motivated by a desire for a personal benefit, not some greater good"). For an
argument that this view of cooperation is too narrow, see Michael A. Simons,
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"character" far more easily. For example, a corporation that
changes its top management after discovering wrongdoing may
seem to the prosecutor like a "new person."67 Similarly, if a
corporation's top management terminates and readily
cooperates against the wrongdoers within the company, the
prosecutor may view the wrongdoing as not reflective of the
corporation's character. By contrast, if a corporation defends
the wrongdoers and resists prosecutorial demands to
cooperate, 68 the prosecutor is likely to view the corporation as
having a "bad" character (i.e., one that tolerates, or even
condones, wrongdoing).69
Indeed, prosecutors put such great weight on cooperation
that it can often save a corporation from indictment even if the
corporation lacked a meaningful compliance program, even if
top management knew about the criminal activity, and even if
top management was involved in the criminal activity.70 To do
this, however, the corporation must cooperate so fully that it
convinces prosecutors that it is a "good corporate citizen."'
C. How to Be (or Not to Be) a "Good Corporate Citizen"
Almost every corporation under investigation promptly
announces that it is "cooperating" with the investigation.72 But
Retribution for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2003).
67 See infra notes 89-132 and accompanying text (discussing the different
fates of corporations that cooperated with criminal investigations and corporations
that did not).
68 The corporation, of course, may feel that its employees have done nothing
wrong. That the corporation disagrees with the prosecutor on this score, however,
is unlikely to help convince the prosecutor of the corporation's virtuous character.
69 As one-time corporate defense attorney and current federal judge Jed Rakoff
has noted: "[P]rosecutors are reluctant to bring the criminal law to bear against
organizations that appear more rueful than recalcitrant. Simply put, prosecutors
tend to view themselves as avenging angels in simple morality plays where evil is
banished and social order restored." Jed S. Rakoff, Four Postulates of White-Collar
Practice, 210 N.Y.L.J. 3, 3 (1993).
70 See infra notes 72-73. While the involvement of top management in the
criminal activity may be a reflection of deep corporate culpability, there is often
little reason to prosecute the corporation once the top managers have been
prosecuted.
71 See generally Symposium, Corporate Crime In America: Strengthening the
"Good Citizen" Corporation, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION (1995)
(collection of materials from a two-day conference devoted to the "good corporate
citizenship" movement).
72 For example, in early November 2001, in the midst of the massive shredding
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cooperation comes in many forms, and prosecutors are
increasingly demanding that corporations do far more than
simply hand over documents and make witnesses available. 73
Traditionally, a corporation faced with apparent
wrongdoing within its ranks would conduct an internal
investigation-interviewing witnesses and gathering documents
to determine exactly what happened and who was responsible. 74
The corporation's investigators (usually outside counsel) could
act quickly and thoroughly because employees could be
threatened with termination if they did not cooperate. 75 The
corporation would then evaluate the results of the internal
investigation to determine the extent of the corporation's civil
and criminal exposure and what remedial action, if any, should
be taken. 76
Now, prosecutors take a far more aggressive approach.7 7 If
a corporation hopes to avoid indictment, it may have to disclose
the factual findings of the internal investigation,78 to disclose all
that eventually led to its indictment, Andersen announced that "the firm 'will
continue to cooperate with [Enron's] special committee, lawyers and accounting
advisers' and 'will also cooperate with other official investigations as requested.' "
Jonathan Weil, What Enron's Financial Reports Did-and Didn't-Reveal, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 5, 2001, at C1 (quoting Andersen spokesman David Tabolt); see also
Richard A. Oppel, Jr. & Kurt Eichenwald, Arthur Andersen-Fires an Executive for
Enron Orders, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2002, at Al (quoting Andersen as admitting
that its "expedited effort to destroy documents" began on Oct. 23, 2001 and
continued until Nov. 9, 2001).
73 See, e.g., Johnny Frank, How to Cooperate with the Prosecutor, N.J.L.J. 6, 24
(1995) ("Corporate cooperation formerly entailed making documents and employees
available to government investigators. In many prosecutor's offices, however, such
assistance in and of itself no longer qualifies as cooperation.").
74 See Lisa A. Cahill, Internal Investigations and Waiving Corporate Privilege,
224 N.Y.L.J. 5 (2000); Jed S. Rakoff, Coerced Waiver of Corporate Privilege, 214
N.Y.L.J. 3 (1995); Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 8, at 152.
75 See Rakoff, supra note 74, at 3 ("Counsel conducting the internal
investigation on behalf of the company can demand that employees answer his
inquiries upon pain of being discharged if they refuse to do so"); Harvey L. Pitt et
al, Director Duties to Uncover and Respond to Management Misconduct, 11
INSIGHTS 5, 7 (1997) (noting that corporations can require employees who are
"accused or suspected of improper conduct" to "cooperate with any internal
inquiries by the company").
76 See Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 8, at 152-53.
77 See Rakoff, supra note 74, at 3 ("While the evidence of this increased
aggressiveness is largely anecdotal, it is affirmed by virtually every defense
counsel who practices in this field."); Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 8, at 156-58
(describing "Itihe brave new world" of defending a corporation in the face of the
"newly aggressive stance of prosecutors").
78 Cahill, supra note 74, at 5 ("It is no longer news to anyone that, as part of a
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of the information gathered during the internal investigation,79
to waive the attorney-client privilege and work-product
protection,80 to terminate the offending employees,81 to replace
management, and even to actively assist the government in
covert investigations of employees, competitors, vendors, and
clients.8 2 To prosecutors, this "super-cooperation" is simply
"good corporate citizenship." 3 To corporations, it can be a
minefield.
While avoiding indictment will be of paramount importance
to most corporations, the expansive cooperation demanded by
prosecutors is not without its perils. Most obviously, the
information provided to prosecutors-particularly information
that might otherwise be protected by privileged or as attorney
cooperation deal, U.S. Attorney's Offices are increasingly requiring corporations
... to disclose, at a minimum, the factual findings of an internal investigation.").
79 See Frank, supra note 73, at 24 (noting that prosecutors expect a
cooperating corporation to furnish "its entire investigative file"); Molly
McDonough, 'Fessin Up Hard to Do, But Still Right Thing: Prosecutor, CHI. DAILY
L. BULL., Oct. 1, 1999, at 1 (reporting the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of
Illinois' observation that the best form of corporate cooperation involves "a
company which has done its own investigation, complete with confessions and
affidavits, and hands it to .the government").
80 See Robert G. Morvillo, The Decline of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 218
N.Y.L.J. 3 (1997) ("The office of the United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York routinely coerces corporate waivers of the privilege by
informing corporate managers that their failure to waive the privilege will be
evaluated in determining whether the corporation has been sufficiently cooperative
to avoid indictment and/or a severe guidelines sentence."); Pomerantz, supra note
61 (former federal prosecutor noting that "[tihe request for a privilege waiver has
become the rule rather than the exception").
81 See Tamara Loomis, Privilege Waivers: Prosecutors Step Up Use of
Bargaining Waivers, 224 N.Y.L.J. 5 (2000) (reporting that federal prosecutors in
the Southern District of New York (S.D.N.Y.) "often pressured corporations to fire
employees who refuse to cooperate in its investigation"); Pomerantz, supra note 61
(former S.D.N.Y. prosecutor noting that a cooperating corporation "often is well
advised" to "root out its corrupt employees, and cut them off from financial support
and information").
82 See Frank, supra note 73, at 24 (noting that cooperation can entail
"[slupporting and participating in covert investigations of the corporation's
employees, vendors, and clients" and "[aissisting the investigative team in
conducting surprise work-site inspections, interviews of potential witnesses at
their homes, search warrants, and arrests").
83 This practice of demanding "super-cooperation" from corporations
(particularly privilege waivers) predates the 1999 DOJ policy statement. See supra
note 39. Though the origins of the practice are unclear, at least some districts were
demanding privilege waivers from corporations in the early 1990s. See Loomis,
supra note 81 (noting that the U.S. Attorney's Office for the S.D.N.Y. has been
requesting privilege waivers since the early 1990s).
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work product-may expose the corporation to punishing civil
liability. By disclosing privileged material to the government,
the corporation will likely preclude itself from asserting its
privileges in later civil proceedings.8 4 The resulting disclosures
may substantially increase the company's civil liability; 5 at a
minimum, they will make it far easier for plaintiffs to enforce
that liability.
Cooperation may also devastate corporate morale,8 6
particularly if employees are terminated or prosecuted based on
privileged statements made to the corporation.8 7 When the
misconduct is severe enough, cooperation may also imperil the
positions of top management.88
For these reasons, a corporation's decision about whether to
accede to prosecutorial demands for super-cooperation can be
extraordinarily difficult. Some companies resist altogether,
proclaiming the innocence of their employees (and, by extension,
themselves). Other companies, while admitting their
employees' guilt, resist prosecutorial demands to assist in the
investigation. Still others, while nominally "cooperating" in the
investigation, deny accusations of systemic problems and
proclaim little need for organizational changes. For these
companies, the price of resisting can be devastating. By
contrast, other companies-including companies whose
employees engaged in serious misconduct-have been able to
avoid indictment altogether by cooperating thoroughly enough
to demonstrate their "good corporate citizenship."
84 See Rakoff, supra note 74, at 3 ("[Elvery federal circuit court that has
addressed the issue, save one (the Eighth), has held that disclosure of a company's
internal investigative files to the Government constitutes a waiver of privilege,
with respect to those files, as to all other persons.") (citing cases).
85 See Richard Gruner, Avoiding Fines Through Offense Monitoring, Detection,
and Disclosure: The Race for Amnesty, 1230 PLIICORP. 77, 115 (2000) (arguing that
civil liabilities would often be imposed even absent disclosures to prosecutors).
86 See id. at 115-16; see also Ellen S. Podgor, White-Collar Cooperators: The
Government in Employer-Employee Relationships, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 795, 803
(2002) ("Placing the employer and employee in an adversarial position, in an
attempt to secure the benefits of cooperation, interferes with the overriding
fiduciary employment relationship.").
87 Employee mistrust of the corporation (and its lawyers) may also hamper
future compliance efforts. See Zornow & Krakaur, supra note 8, at 156 (arguing
that corporate cooperation "has the effect of chilling" counsel's inquiry into possible
wrongdoing and "often has an adverse impact on the relationships among senior
management and lower-level employees").
88 See infra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
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Consider the following contrasting cases:
Kidder. In 1986, Rudolf Giuliani, then United States
Attorney for the Southern District of New York, began a wide-
ranging investigation into illegal insider trading on Wall
Street.8 9 Giuliani's key cooperator-Ivan Boesky-led Giuliani
to Martin Siegel, a director at Kidder Peabody & Company.90
Federal prosecutors soon learned that Siegel, Boesky, and
others had participated in multiple illegal trading schemes
(some of which directly benefited Kidder).91  When the
investigation became public in February 1987, Kidder had
recently been acquired by General Electric, although GE had
not taken an active role in managing its subsidiary.92 Upon
learning of the government's investigation, however, GE moved
aggressively to assume control of Kidder and to cooperate fully
with the investigation.93 GE fired Kidder's top management,
instituted extensive structural, managerial, and policy changes
designed to prevent a recurrence of the misconduct, and rapidly
settled civil charges with the SEC.94 As a direct result of this
cooperation, within four months federal prosecutors had
announced that no criminal charges would be filed against
Kidder.95
89 For a detailed examination of the insider-trading scandals of the 1980s, see
JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES (Simon & Schuster 1992).
90 See William Glaberson, Wall St. Informer Admits His Guilt In Insider
Trading, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1987, at Al.
91 See id. According to the SEC, Kidder's profits from the illegal activity
amounted to $13.7 million. See James Sterngold, Kidder Agrees To Pay $25 Million
To Settle Insider Trading Charges, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1987, at Al.
92 See Robert J. Cole, G.E. Tightens Reins At Kidder, Peabody, N.Y. TIMES,
May 15, 1987, at Dl. GE had purchased Kidder in June 1986, just eight months
before it learned of the government investigation (when two top Kidder executives
were arrested in Kidder's offices). See James B. Stewart & Janet Guyon, Damage
Control: How GE and Kidder Managed to Ward Off an Impending Disaster, WALL
ST. J., June 8, 1987, at 1.
93 See Sterngold, supra note 91; Stewart & Guyon, supra note 92.
94 See United States Attorney's Office, Announcement of Decision Not to
Prosecute Kidder, Peabody & Co. (June 4, 1987), reprinted in Press Releases Issued
By United States Attorney, Southern District Of New York, 1248 PLI/CORP. 197,
199-202 (2001). Kidder paid a $25.3 million fine to the SEC. See Sterngold, supra
note 91. According to one GE executive, the strategy was to transform Kidder so
that it would be a different company that the one involved in the wrongdoing: " 'We
were trying to convince [Giuliani] that the Kidder that existed then and had been
involved in the Siegel situation wouldn't be the future Kidder[]'" See Stewart &
Guyon, supra note 92, at 10.
95 The press release announcing Giuliani's decision not to prosecute
emphasized that Kidder's (and GE's) cooperation was a key reason for'his
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Drexel. Ivan Boesky also led federal prosecutors to Michael
Milken, the "junk bond king" of Drexel Burnham Lambert.96
Drexel's corporate reaction to the investigation could not have
been more different than Kidder's. 97  As the investigation
proceeded during 1987 and 1988, Drexel vigorously denied any
wrongdoing, steadfastly defended its employees, and vowed to
fight any charges. 9 Eventually, faced with the prospect of a
RICO indictment, Drexel pleaded guilty to six counts of fraud
and paid a $300 million fine. 99 Within months, Drexel had
ceased to exist, filing for bankruptcy, liquidating its assets, and
laying off over 3,000 employees. 100
forbearance:
The decision by the United States Attorney was based on four principal
factors: Kidder's full cooperation with the Government's investigation;
Kidder's entry into a consent judgment with the SEC in the SEC's related
investigation, which provides mechanisms to avoid the commission of
securities violations in the future; structural, management and policy
changes instituted at Kidder by Kidder's new owner, the General Electric
Company; and the negative effect that charges against the firm would
have on Kidder's thousands of innocent employees and the firm's
legitimate activities. . . . The United States Attorney explained that
because G.E. decided at an early stage to cooperate fully with the
Government, began institution of vigorous structural, management, policy
and trading reforms, and reached an appropriate agreement with the
SEC, the public interest has well served; at this point a prosecution of
Kidder is unnecessary.
Announcement of Decision Not to Prosecute, supra note 94. This forbearance was a
marked change from Giuliani's position four months earlier, when he told Kidder
officials that the firm would be indicted for insider trading. See Stewart & Guyon,
supra note 92.
96 Laurie P. Cohen, With Signed Checks, Formal Guilty Plea, Drexel Ends
Ordeal, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1989, at A3.
97 Indeed, Giuliani's agreement not to prosecute Kidder was widely
interpreted as a message "aimed at Drexel," which at the time was still resisting
"any suggestion that they have problems that need fixing." Sterngold, supra note
91, at D4. Drexel obviously did not get the message.
98 See James B. Stewart & Daniel Hertzberg, Civil Charges Against Drexel
and Milken To Be Sought by SEC Staff, Sources Say, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1988, at
3 (reporting that when the SEC staff notified Drexel of its recommendation to seek
charges against the company, Drexel's spokesman stated: "'Drexel has denied any
wrongdoing, and has said its own investigations have produced no evidence of any
wrongdoing by any of its employees.' ").
99 Cohen, supra note 96; see also United States Attorney's Office, Outline of
Charges: United States v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Incorporated (Jan. 24, 1989),
reprinted in Press Releases Issued by United States Attorney, Southern District of
New York, 1248 PLI/CORP. 197, 203 (2001).
109 George Anders, A Shadow of Itself, Drexel Comes Back from Bankruptcy,
WALL ST. J., Apr. 30, 1992, at C1. One prominent securities lawyer has noted that
"mlany observers believe that if the Drexel firm had chosen to cooperate with
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Salomon Brothers. In June 1991, the Department of
Justice and the SEC began investigating illegal purchases of
government securities by Salomon Brothers, Inc.10 1 In August,
after conducting a "full investigation" Salomon acknowledged
that its government bond trader, Paul Moser, had violated
bidding rules at auctions in December, February, and May. 10 2
When it acknowledged the wrongdoing, Salomon suspended
Moser and three of his associates and claimed that the four
suspended employees acted "without the knowledge of
management." 0 3  As it turns out, Salomon's top officers,
including its Chairman, its Vice-Chairman, and its President,
were told about the illegal bidding in April-well before the May
auction at which the misconduct was repeated and four months
before the wrongdoing was disclosed to regulators. 0 4  As
Salomon reeled under the disclosures and the intensifying
investigation, Warren Buffet-its largest shareholder-came to
the rescue. Within days, Salomon's top three officials had
resigned, Buffet had become interim chairman, a new chief
operating officer (who was unconnected with the scandal) had
been appointed, and Salomon had begun cooperating with the
authorities. Under Buffet's leadership, Salomon not only
provided documents and made employees available for
interviews, it also waived its attorney-client privilege, provided
detailed information about the firm's own internal
government prosecutors at the start, the firm would still be alive and prospering."
Arthur F. Mathews, Defending SEC and DOJ FCPA Investigations and Conducting
Related Corporate Internal Investigations: The Triton Energy/Indonesia SEC
Consent Decree Settlements, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUs. 303, 429-40 (1998).
101 See Michael Siconolfi et al., The Big Squeeze: Salomon's Admission Of T-
Note Infractions Gives Market a Jolt, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1991, at Al. Treasury
Department regulations bar individual bidders from purchasing more than 35% of
the treasury notes offered in any particular auction. By submitting unauthorized
bids in the name of Salomon customers, Salomon was able to far exceed the 35%
limit, sometimes reaching as high as 85%. See Michael Siconolfi & Laurie P.
Cohen, The Treasury Auction Scandal at Salomon: A Chronology: How It All
Unfolded, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1991, at A4.
102 See Siconolfi & Cohen, supra note 101.
103 See Siconolfi et al., supra note 101.
104 See Michael Siconolfi et al, Top Salomon Officials Knew About Illegal Bid,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 1991, at Cl. When the firm admitted that its top officials had
known of the misconduct, it claimed it intended to disclose the wrongdoing sooner,
but just did not get around to it. See id. (quoting the firm's press statement:
"Management immediately determined that this matter must be communicated to
the government; however, due to a lack of sufficient attention to the matter, this
determination was not implemented promptly").
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investigation, and, as described by federal prosecutors, took
"decisive and extraordinary actions to restructure its
management to avoid future misconduct. " 10 5 Nine months later,
when federal prosecutors announced that Salomon would not be
prosecuted, the United States Attorney specifically credited
Salomon's "exemplary" and "unprecedented" cooperation. 10 6
Indeed, Salomon's cooperation has become the gold standard of
what prosecutors expect from corporations under
investigation. 0 7
Cooper Companies. In early 1992, at the same time that
Salomon was engaging in its "exemplary" cooperation, federal
prosecutors began investigating allegations that the chairman
of Cooper Companies had been involved in a scheme to profit
from inside tips on junk bond trades. 08 Cooper Companies'
approach was the polar opposite of Salomon's. 10 9 During the
investigation, both the chairman and the company proclaimed
105 United States Attorney's Office, Department of Justice and SEC Enter $290
Million Settlement With Salomon Brothers in Treasury Securities Case (May 20,
1992), reprinted in Press Releases Issued by United States Attorney, Southern
District of New York, 1248 PLIICORP. 197, 211-14 (2001); see also Mathews, supra
note 101, at 419. Buffett also set out to change Salomon's famously aggressive
character. See Michael Siconolfi & Laurie P. Cohen, Sullied Solly: How Salomon's
Hubris and a U.S. Trap Led To Leaders' Downfall, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1991, at
Al ("Mr. Buffett [told Salomon's managing directors that] any action by Salomon
even approaching impropriety won't be tolerated. 'Anything not only on the line,
but near the line, will be called out,' a senior managing director said Mr. Buffett
told them.").
106 Department of Justice and SEC Enter $290 Million Settlement with
Salomon Brothers in Treasury Securities Case, supra note 105, at 213; Otto
Obermaier, Do the Right Thing; But if a Company Doesn't, It Can Limit the
Damage, BARRON'S, Dec. 14, 1992, at 18 (noting that Salomon was not prosecuted
because "the board removed the chief executive officer and several subsidiary
officers, instituted procedures for ethics and compliance, and gave every indication
that it was turning over a new leaf').
107 See Otto G. Obermaier, Drafting Companies to Fight Crime, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 1992, at 11 (then-U.S. Attorney pointing to Salomon's "exemplary"
cooperation and noting that "[g]ood corporate citizenship is now defined by
expanded obligations").
108 See Diana B. Henriques, Cooper Companies and Former Head Are Indicted,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1992, at D1. The scheme allegedly resulted in $3.6 million in
profits, some of which went to the company and some of which went to the
chairman and his family. See id. In the interest of full disclosure, I should note
that as a young associate doing white collar defense work in the early 1990s, I
helped represent Cooper Company's chairman during the investigation and
ensuing trial in which Cooper Companies was a co-defendant.
109 See Obermaier, supra note 106, at 18 (then-U.S. Attorney contrasting the
responses of Salomon and Cooper Companies to federal investigations).
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their innocence. 110  In late 1992, when the chairman was
indicted for racketeering, money laundering, and fraud, the
company was indicted as well."' In explaining the charges
against the company, the United States Attorney noted that the
company had "done little, if anything, to rectify the wrongdoing
of the individuals associated with the company. ' 1 2 Cooper
Companies was eventually convicted of seven counts of fraud"13
and ordered to pay a $1.8 million fine, 114 an amount that
constituted a "genuine threat to the financial viability of the
company.""15
Prudential Securities. In mid-1993, federal prosecutors
began investigating whether brokers at Prudential Securities
committed fraud in the sale of limited partnerships in the
1980s. 116  By the time the criminal investigation began,
110 See Floyd Norris, Analyst Pleads Guilty in Junk Bond Scheme, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 1992, at D5 (reporting that the company's spokesman responded to the
first public accusations of wrongdoing by saying, "The company denies any
wrongdoing and is unaware of any wrongdoing on the part of its officers or
employees"); Jonathan M. Moses, Cooper Cos., Former Executive Charged In Junk
Bond Insider-Trading Case, WALL ST. J., Nov. 11, 1992, at B9 (reporting that the
company's attorney responded to its indictment by saying that the "company
'intends vigorously to defend itself against' the allegations").
111 See Henriques, supra note 108; Moses, supra note 110.
112 See Moses, supra note 110 (quoting then-U.S. Attorney Otto Obermaier). In
particular, authorities complained that the company failed to remove the chairman
and his brother "from positions of authority after they had refused to cooperate
both with the Federal investigations and with the company's own internal
investigation," failed to take any action "to recover the company's misappropriated
trading profits," and allowed the chairman "to issue false and misleading news
releases" after the investigation became public. Diana B. Henriques, Cooper
Companies to Pay in Fraud Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1994, at D5.
213 See Diana B. Henriques, Cooper's Ex-Chairman Convicted in Fraud Case,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1994, at D3. When the company was convicted, the United
States Attorney emphasized that its fate turned on its lack of cooperation:
United States Attorney Mary Jo White said yesterday it was 'regrettable
that the innocent investors of the Cooper Companies Inc. must suffer as a
result of today's verdict.' She added, 'It must be understood that
corporations like the Cooper Companies, who do little if anything to
rectify the prior wrongdoing of their employees, will be held accountable.'
Id.
114 See Henriques, supra note 112.
115 David M. Zornow, Should Companies Turn Themselves In?, 212 N.Y.L.J. S3
(1994).
116 See Michael Siconolfi, Prudential Securities Partnerships Are Now Subject
of U.S. Criminal Inquiry, WALL ST. J., June 18, 1993, at A4. In particular, as it
eventually admitted, Prudential sold over $1.4 billion in limited partnership
investments by lying to investors about the structure of the investments and the
risks that accompanied them. United States Attorney's Office, Announcement of
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Prudential had already spent several years fighting off
securities regulators and angry investors. 117 In the early stages
of the criminal investigation, Prudential did not take a
"Salomon-like" approach. By the end of 1993, however, the
criminal investigation had widened its scope. In particular,
prosecutors had begun focusing on alleged wrongdoing with
Prudential Securities parent company, Prudential Insurance
Company, at the time the nation's largest insurance company. 11
Prudential's approach soon changed. It demoted its long-time
general counsel (the only senior executive remaining at the firm
from the 1980s), began a wide-ranging shake up of its brokerage
management, and eventually started cooperating with the
criminal investigation. 119 By October 1994, Prudential had
worked out a deal with federal prosecutors that allowed it to
avoid indictment. In announcing the deal, the United States
Attorney specifically pointed to four factors that influenced her
decision: that Prudential had cooperated during the
investigation and had acknowledged its own wrongdoing, that
all of the individuals responsible for the wrongdoing had left the
company, that Prudential had agreed to substantial civil fines
and restitution, and that an indictment could "cause crippling
collateral consequences to thousands of innocent employees and
investors."120 Prudential did, however, pay a price for its initial
reluctance to cooperate. Unlike Salomon, Prudential was
required to agree to a "deferred prosecution," a formal
agreement pursuant to which Prudential admitted its
Filing of Criminal Complaint Against Prudential Securities Incorporated (Oct. 27,
1994, reprinted in Press Releases Issued By United States Attorney, Southern
District of New York, 1248 PLICORP. 197, 219-23 (2001)).
117 See Kurt Eichenwald, Prudential Reported to Seek a Settlement with
S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1993, at D1.
118 See Kurt Eichenwald, Prudential Fraud Scandal Reaches to Parent
Company, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1993, at Dl; Kurt Eichenwald, U.S. Broadening
Prudential Criminal Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 1993, at D1; Michael Siconolfi &
Greg Steinmetz, Prosecutors Are Examining Involvement by Prudential Insurance
on Partnerships, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 1993, at C1.
119 See Michael Siconolfi, Prudential Unit Strips Schechter of Legal Duties:
General Counsel Leaves Post Amid Widening Inquiry Into Partnership Deals, WALL
ST. J., Dec. 31, 1993, at 3 (describing the demotion as a "sudden shift" that
"stunned Wall Street executives"); see also Kurt Eichenwald, Shake-Up Under Way
at Prudential, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1994, at Dl.
120 See Press Releases of United States Attorney, Southern District of New
York, supra note 116, at 219-20; Kurt Eichenwald, Brokerage Firm Admits Crimes
in Energy Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1994, at Al.
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wrongdoing in court and accepted a form of voluntary probation
for three years. 21
Daiwa Bank. In July of 1995, Daiwa Bank discovered that
one of its employees in New York had lost $1.1 billion through
scheme in which he engaged in unauthorized bond trading and
then covered his losses by selling bonds belonging to the bank
and its customers. 22 The scheme, which had lasted for eleven
years, was concealed by the employee through countless false
statements in the bank's records. 123 After the bank learned of
the misconduct, it waited almost two months to inform
regulators. 124 Even after disclosing the loss, the bank resisted
the full cooperation demanded by prosecutors. 125 As a result, it
121 See Press Releases of United States Attorney, Southern District of New
York, supra note 116, at 219-20; Eichenwald, supra note 119 (noting that
Prudential's admission came "[aifter more than three years of denying that it broke
the law"). The deferred prosecution agreement required Prudential: (1) to
contribute $330 million (on top of $330 already paid) into a restitution fund; (2) to
install an independent "ombudsman" to receive and report on allegations of
misconduct; (3) to retain an independent law firm to review the adequacy of its
compliance controls; and (4) to fully and truthfully cooperate "in any criminal
investigations, including voluntarily providing 'any requested records and
unlimited access to governmental authorities to [Prudential's] facilities, documents
and employees." United States Attorney's Office Press Release, supra note 116, at
219-20. The agreement also required Prudential's parent companies to cooperate.
See id.
122 See Peter Truell, A Japanese Bank Is Indicted in U.S. and Also Barred,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1995, at Al. Another disclosure: as an Assistant United States
Attorney in the Southern District of New York in the mid-1990s, I participated in
the investigation and prosecution of Daiwa Bank and its officers and employees.
123 The scheme began when the trader sought to cover-up a $200,000 loss from
authorized trading. Eleven years and 30,000 trades later that loss had grown to
$1.1 billion. The trader was able to cover-up his losses because, in a breach of
standard security, he was entrusted both with making the trades and accounting
for them in the bank's books. See An Unusual Path. to Big-Time Trading, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995, at D6.
124 See Peter Truell, Daiwa Bank Admits Guilt in Cover-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
29, 1996, at D1. During that time, the bank actively explored ways in which it
could conceal the losses from regulators. See Truell, supra note 122 (reporting that
"the bank even considered concealing the whole trading loss at a company in the
Cayman Islands" before that plan "was 'ultimately rejected by Daiwa's senior
management as not feasible' " (quoting the indictment)). Even when it did disclose
the losses, the bank "attributed them to a rogue trader and did not mention that it
had known about the losses" for almost two months. See id.
125 Then-United States Attorney Mary Jo White has explained that her office
made repeated attempts to obtain the bank's cooperation in the investigation of the
trading loss, " 'but no meaningful cooperation was ever given.' " See Mathews,
supra note 100, at 439 (quoting Daiwa Pleads Guilty to 16 Felonies, Pays a $340
Million Criminal Fine, CORP. CRIME. REP., Mar. 4, 1996, at 3).
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was indicted within weeks on multiple charges of conspiracy,
fraud, obstruction, falsification of bank records, and misprision
of felony.126 When Daiwa pleaded guilty four months later, it
was ordered to pay a $340 million fine.127 By that time, it had
already been expelled from the United States by bank
regulators. 128 At sentencing, the prosecution was explicit about
the reason Daiwa was prosecuted-it had failed to cooperate
like a "good corporate citizen":
"[If the employee's crimes] were all that were involved in this
case, and had Daiwa reported timely those crimes, it is
unlikely Daiwa would have been charged at all.... [Tihe fine
of this magnitude is justified, in part, because Daiwa had
steadfastly refused to provide any meaningful cooperation in
the investigation of this matter. While providing cooperation
is not required by law, the government routinely rewards
corporations that provide timely and genuine cooperation to
the government in investigating the criminal conduct of its
employees."129
Other corporations have fared similarly under this
prosecutorial view of "good corporate citizenship."130  And
126 See Truell, supra note 122.
127 See Truell, supra note 124.
128 See Truell, supra note 122.
129 See Mathews, supra note 100, at 439 (quoting sentencing statement of
Assistant United States Attorney Reid Figel); see also Abromowitz & Bohrer, supra
note 8 (noting that Mary Jo White, the U.S. Attorney who prosecuted Daiwa,
"brought a series of highly publicized prosecutions against a number of major
corporations" with "the stated objective of changing corporate culture to encourage
honesty and promote greater emphasis on internal controls and compliance" and to
put forth the message that "corporations should put good citizenship ahead of their
business interests").
130 For example, in 1993, the government declined to prosecute Sequa
Corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary Chromalloy Turbine Corporation for
fraud in the manufacture and repair of airplane parts. In announcing the decision,
then-U.S. Attorney Mary Jo White stated that she was declining to prosecute
"because Sequa and Chromalloy decided to cooperate fully with the Government;
began institution of vigorous structural, management, and policy reforms; and
reached an appropriate agreement with the FAA." See United States Attorney's
Office, Announcement of Decision Not to Prosecute Sequa Corporation (June 24,
1993); reprinted in Press Releases Issued by United States Attorney, Southern
District of New York, 1248 PLI/CORP. 197, 211-14 (2001). Contrast Sequa's fate
with the fate of Bankers Trust, which admitted in 1997 that high-ranking officials
had been operating a "slush fund" of unclaimed customer money that was then
falsely booked as income to inflate revenue and meet budgeted projections. See
Betty Santangelo & Suzanne Berman, Did Bankers Trust Alter the Rules?,
N.Y.L.J., Nov. 20, 2000, at S4; Benjamin Weiser, Bankers Trust Admits Diverting
Unclaimed Money, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1999, at Al. Although the bank eventually
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although each of the cases discussed above occurred in the
Southern District of New York, prosecutorial rewards for good
corporate citizenship (and punishment for corporate
recalcitrance) are not limited to that district.'3 ' Indeed, with
the publication of Federal Prosecutions of Corporations, the
Southern District of New York's practices have become
Department of Justice Policy.132
Some clear lessons emerge from these cases. Most
obviously, a corporation that denies wrongdoing and resists a
criminal investigation is far more likely to be indicted than a
corporation that cooperates with prosecutors. More
particularly, a corporation's chances of avoiding indictment are
much greater if the cooperation admits its responsibility for the
wrongdoing, terminates the wrongdoers, rids itself of the top
management in charge at the time of the wrongdoing, and
waives its privileges so that its cooperation and be free and
unfettered.
Among these factors, perhaps the most important in
facilitating a corporation's full cooperation is a change in top
management. Each of the corporations discussed above that
avoided indictment-Kidder, Salomon, and Prudential-had
experienced significant management changes before embarking
on its course of cooperation. 133 Indeed, without a change in top
disclosed the misconduct to prosecutors and regulators, it did so two years after
state regulators first started asking questions about missing unclaimed funds. See
Timothy L. O'Brien, The Deep Slush at Bankers Trust, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1999,
§ 3, at 1. Moreover, even after the bank disclosed the violations and began
"cooperating" with prosecutors, it continued to minimize the involvement of its
executives in the scam. See id.; Santangelo & Berman, supra. Indeed, it appears
that some of the bank executives who participated in the bank's early "cooperation"
with the authorities did not initially disclose their own involvement in the slush
fund scheme. See Weiser, supra.
131 For example, in 1997, the Central District of California investigated
allegations that a partner at the accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand had
committed multiple crimes in connection with the personal financial statements of
Arizona's governor (including bid-rigging, perjury, and obstruction of justice).
Coopers was not charged, however, because of its exemplary conduct following
notification of possible wrongdoing, its public acceptance of responsibility, its
ongoing cooperation with investigators, its restitution payments, its agreement to
perform community service, and its agreement to institute nationwide ethics
training for its professionals. F. Joseph Warin & Jason C. Schwartz, Deferred
Prosecution: The Need for Specialized Guidelines for Corporate Defendants, 23 J.
CORP. L. 121, 126 (1997).
132 See supra note 62.
133 William Laufer has criticized corporate cooperation on the grounds that
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management, it can be nearly impossible for a corporation to
fully cooperate, because the top managers will essentially be
cooperating against themselves. Which brings me to my final
point.
III. VICARIOUS SNITCHING
All this talk of "corporations" cooperating can obscure one
important fact. Corporations don't cooperate; people do. It is
the corporation's officers-its general counsel, its CEO, and its
board members-who must decide whether and to what extent
the corporation will cooperate. And that decision is inevitably
tied up with the decision-makers' self-interest.
In some cases, the self-interest of the corporate decision-
makers will be obvious, as when the corporate decision-makers
themselves are under investigation. For example, in the Cooper
Companies case, the alleged wrongdoer was the chairman
himself.34 The board, which at the time included three of the
chairman's relatives, 135 was not likely to insist on a course of
cooperation that would have entailed "turning" on its own
chairman.136
In other cases, the self-interest of the corporate decision-
makers will be less direct. Board members may not be
concerned about criminal prosecution, but they may be
concerned about individual civil liability for failing to
adequately monitor employees. 37 And because cooperation will
most "corporate deviance" is related to the "actions of top management" and "to
organizational processes, decisions, structures, hierarchy, and culture," not just to
the individual actions of a few wrongdoers. See William J. Laufer, Corporate
Prosecution, Cooperation, and the Trading of Favors, 87 IOWA L. REV. 643, 657-58
(2002) ("If there is a prototypic case of reverse whistle-blowing, it is with an
organization in which senior management winks at the illegal behavior of
subordinate employees when under significant pressure to meet revenue or profit
objectives."). While Laufer's criticism has undeniable force, it ignores the extent to
which changes in top management are often an essential part of, or prerequisite to,
corporate cooperation.
134 See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text.
15 See Diana B. Henriques, A Wall Street Parable with No Heroes, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 1992, § 3, at 1.
136 The chairman's brother, at the time the Chief Operating Officer and a
member of the board, was also alleged to have participated in the wrongdoing. See
Moses, supra note 110, at B9 (describing SEC enforcement action against the two
brothers).
137 See In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959,
968-70 (Del. Ch. 1996) (finding that corporate directors may be exposed to personal
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likely entail privilege waivers, board members may increase
their own personal liability by waiving the corporation's
privilege. 38 Board members may also be driven by personal
loyalties-to the chief executive who appointed them, to the top
manager who made the company profitable, or to the company's
workforce as a whole. 139 At the most basic level, board members
may be simply concerned with maintaining their own positions,
which could be imperiled by cooperation-driven management
changes.140
A corporation's decision about whether to cooperate is
difficult enough;' 4 ' it is essential that the decision be made by
liability for failing to adequately monitor employee-wrongdoers); Brown, supra
note 20. For example, John Gutfreund, the CEO of Salomon until Warren Buffet
took over, was eventually charged by the SEC with failing to properly supervise
employees. The board of Cooper Companies was similarly "publicly criticized" by
the SEC "for failing to take measures that precluded misconduct from recurring."
Harvey L. Pitt et al., supra note 75, at 5 (citing In re Gutfreund, [1992 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 85,067, at 85,597 (Dec. 3, 1992) (Gutfreund) &
In re Cooper Companies, [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
85,472, at 86,601 (Dec. 12 1994)). George Ball, who headed Prudential Securities
when its employees were misleading investors in the 1980s and under whose
leadership the company resisted the criminal investigation, see supra notes 116-18
and accompanying text, was also investigated by the SEC for charges of failing to
supervise his employees. See Patrick McGeehan, Investigation of Prudential
Securities By U.S. Attorney Ends Without Charges, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1996, at
A2 (noting that the SEC was ultimately unable to bring civil charges because the
statute of limitations had run).
138 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
139 For example, Drexel's steadfast loyalty to its junk bond star Michael
Milken made cooperation with the government's investigation effectively
impossible. See supra note 96-99 and accompanying text.
140 Of course, board members and top officers will also have significant
personal incentives to pursue corporate cooperation. For one, full corporate
cooperation may be the best way for board members' to minimize their personal
liability. For example, in discussing director liability, the Caremark court noted
board members obligation to account for the "powerful incentives for corporations
today to have in place compliance programs to detect violations of law, promptly to
report violations to appropriate public officials when discovered, and to take
prompt, voluntary remedial efforts." See In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969.
Corporate cooperation may also allow board members to shield themselves from
the criminal investigation by "offering up" the offending employees. See Laufer,
supra note 30, at 648 (describing the process of "reverse whistle blowing" in which
"an organization, typically through the acts of senior management, identifies
culpable employees and offers evidence against them in a trade with prosecutors
for corporate leniency or possible amnesty").
141 Notwithstanding the starkly contrasting fates of firms that cooperated
(e.g., Kidder, Salomon, and Prudential) and firms that did not (e.g., Drexel, Cooper,
and Daiwa), it is not always the case that cooperation will be in a firm's best
interest. In particular, if the government is not yet aware of the corporate
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officers who are as disinterested as possible. When Warren
Buffet moved quickly to turn Salomon into an "exemplary"
cooperator, he was not concerned with avoiding personal
liability, preserving his own professional position, or
maintaining personal loyalties to any of Salomon's managers.
Instead, he was concerned with preserving his investment (and,
by extension, all shareholder value). It was this disinterest that
enabled Buffet to move quickly and decisively. Similarly, the
management at GE was able to approach the government's
investigation without concern for personal liabilities or personal
loyalties. Like Buffet, GE was concerned only with preserving
its investment. 142
Of course, when a company is faced with a government
investigation and must decide whether to engage in "super
cooperation," it may not have a disinterested decision-maker
available. 143 Arthur Andersen is the prime example of a
company that-despite its apparent efforts to cooperate-was
unable to satisfy prosecutors that it was a "good corporate
citizen." This failure stemmed in large part from Andersen's
refusal (or inability) to change its management in weeks
following Enron's collapse. As a result, Andersen found itself
indicted and ultimately destroyed-the first organizational
casualty in Enron's aftermath. 144
Since its founding in 1913, Arthur Andersen was one of this
country's most prestigious and successful accounting firms.145
wrongdoing, the firm must weigh the risks of voluntary disclosure (particularly the
increased risk of civil liability) against the likelihood that the wrongdoing will
remain undiscovered. If the wrongdoing is never discovered-and we have no way
of knowing how often corporations discover but do not disclose wrongdoing-the
corporation may not suffer at all. Obviously, a decision to keep the wrongdoing
under wraps is extraordinarily risky, because the adverse consequences of eventual
discovery will be that much more severe, as Daiwa Bank painfully learned. See
supra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
142 See supra notes 89-95 and accompanying text.
143 Even so-called "independent" committees of a corporate board may be
populated with board members who have both concerns about individual liability
and personal loyalties to top management.
144 The best and most detailed exposition of Andersen's rise and collapse
appears in a four-part special report in the Chicago Tribune entitled A Final
Accounting. See Flynn McRoberts et aL, The Fall of Andersen, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 1,
2002, at 1; Flynn McRoberts et al, Civil War Splits Andersen, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 2,
2002, at 1; Flynn McRoberts et al., Ties to Enron Blinded Andersen, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 3, 2002, at 1; Flynn McRoberts et al., Repeat Offender Gets Stiff Justice, CHI.
TRIB, Sept. 4, 2002, at 1.
145 See The Fall of Andersen, supra note 144, at 1 (describing Andersen's
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By 2001, Andersen had developed a long-standing and lucrative
relationship with Enron.146 When Enron's financial structure
began collapsing in the late summer of 2001, Andersen was
stuck right in the middle, as it became more and more apparent
that Enron's impressive profits resulted from accounting tricks
that concealed massive losses. 147  On October 16, Enron
announced a one-time charge of over $1 billion stemming from
losses in its off-balance sheet partnerships. 148 Investors and
regulators reacted immediately.149 On October 18, Enron
announced that the SEC had begun an informal inquiry into its
accounting practices. 50
Andersen's response upon learning of the SEC investigation
was to begin a systematic and massive destruction of Enron
related-documents. 151 For over two weeks, Andersen auditors
founding and history).
146 Enron was one of Andersen's largest clients. In 2000 alone, Andersen billed
Enron $58 million for auditing and consulting services. See Ties to Enron Blinded
Andersen, supra note 144, at 1.
147 See Kurt Eichenwald, Enron's Collapse: The Story Behind its Rise and Fall,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at Al, 26-27 (discussing in detail the practices that
eventually caused Enron to collapse). By October, Enron and Andersen were
arguing about how to disclose the massive losses that were hidden in off balance
sheet partnerships. See Ties to Enron Blinded Andersen, supra note 144, at 1. As
word of the impending announcement reached Andersen's headquarters in
Chicago, the firm began preparing itself for the fallout. See id. On October 9, 2002,
Andersen hired the law firm of Davis Polk and Wardwell to represent it in
expected litigation relating to Enron. See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce House of
Representative No. 107-80, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 30 (Jan. 24, 2002) (testimony of
senior Andersen executive C.E. Andrews), available at http://energycommerce.
house.gov/107/action/ll07-80.pdf.
148 See Ties to Enron Blinded Andersen, supra note 144, at 1.
149 On October 16, 2002, Enron's stock was trading at $33 per share (down
from a high of $90 in August 2000). See Enron Historical Price Lookup, available at
http: / / www.corporate-
ir.net / ireye /ir__site.zhtml?ticker=ENE&script--340&layout=6&itemid=ENE; Ties
to Enron Blinded Andersen, supra note 144, at 1. By the end of October, the share
price had dropped to under $14. By the end of November, the priced had dropped to
under $1 per share. See Enron Historical Price Lookup, supra; Rebecca Smith &
John R. Emshwiller, Running on Empty: Enron Faces Collapse As Credit, Stock
Dive and Dynegy Bolts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 2001, at Al.
150 See Ties To Enron Blinded Andersen, supra note 144, at 1.
151 On October 12, shortly after Davis Polk was hired to represent Andersen in
the expected litigation, Andersen attorney Nancy Temple sent an e-mail to a
partner in the Houston office suggesting that he "remind" everyone of the firm's
"document retention policy." Temple's e-mail also contained a copy of the policy,
which instructed that all non-final drafts and memos should be destroyed. See Kurt
Eichenwald, Andersen Is Said to Rule Out Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at Al.
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and staffers in Houston worked around the clock feeding paper
into shredders and deleting e-mails and computer files.1 2 The
shredding didn't stop until November 9, one day after Andersen
received a subpoena from the SEC. 153
As SEC and Congressional investigations of Enron picked
up steam during November and December, Andersen's
leadership remained confident that it could weather the
crisis. 54 Joseph Berardino, Andersen's managing partner and
CEO, publicly pledged that Andersen would cooperate fully with
the investigators, would acknowledge whatever mistakes it may
have made, and would make whatever changes were necessary
to restore public trust in the firm.' 5
Then, in early January, top Andersen officials learned
about the document destruction binge that had occurred during
the early stages of the SEC investigation. 15 6 Andersen moved
quickly to minimize the damage: it immediately notified the
Department of Justice and the SEC of the shredding and
deletions, and shortly thereafter it publicly announced the
document destruction and that it would fire David Duncan, the
partner in charge of the Enron team, and demote several other
partners. 157 It brought in reputable former public officials to
On October 23, after learning of the impending SEC inquiry, David Duncan, the
Andersen partner in charge of the Enron account, convened a mandatory meeting
of Andersen's Enron team. Duncan told his staff that Andersen would need to
assist Enron in responding to the SEC's investigation. He also instructed them to
comply with the "document retention policy." The massive shredding began that
afternoon. See Ties to Enron Blinded Andersen, supra note 144, at 1.
152 See Ties to Enron Blinded Andersen, supra note 144, at 1 (reporting that
"[w]ithin three days, in Houston and other Andersen offices with Enron-related
work, more than a ton of documents would be discarded-more than is usually
shredded in a year-and roughly 30,000 e-mails and computer files would be
deleted").
153 See id. After Andersen attorney Temple notified the Houston office of the
subpoena, a secretary sent an office-wide e-mail announcing "stop the shredding."
Ken Brown et al, Paper Trail: Andersen Fires Partner It Says Led Shredding of
Enron Documents, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 2002, at Al.
154 See Repeat Offender Gets Stiff Justice, supra note 144, at 1 (reporting that
Andersen CEO Joseph Berardino was confident that "Andersen would survive the
crisis, just as it had other embarrassing audits ... throwing itself on the mercy of
Congress and federal investigators").
155 See Joe Berardino, Enron: A Wake-Up Call, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2001, at
A18; Remarks of Joseph F. Berardino, Managing Partner-Chief Executive Officer,
Andersen, U.S. House of Representatives, Comm. on Financial Services (Dec. 12,
2001), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/121201jb.pdf.
156 See Repeat Offender Gets Stiff Justice, supra note 144, at 1.
157 See id.; Brown et al., supra note 153, at Al.
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help burnish its image: first former Senator John Danforth to
"review" its document retention policy, and later former Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volker to head up an independent
board that would recommend changes to Andersen's audit
practices.158
Predictably, Andersen's possible obstruction of justice soon
became the focus of criminal investigators. Andersen's
strategy-not unlike the strategies used by Kidder, Salomon,
and Prudential-was to pin the blame on a few wrongdoers and
to avoid indictment of the firm by fully cooperating against
those wrongdoers. 159  Andersen's task was complicated,
however, by its spotty record. In recent years, Andersen had
been the auditor for several large corporations-including
Sunbeam and Waste Management-that had to restate their
earnings after admitting fraud in their accounting
statements. 160 To prosecutors, then, Andersen looked less like a
legitimate firm victimized by a rogue employee, and more like a
recidivist offender who had not learned lessons from its previous
transgressions. 161
If Andersen were to avoid indictment, it needed to do more
than just "cooperate." It needed to convince prosecutors that
that it was a new firm, that it had changed its character so that
an accounting scandal like Enron would not happen again. It
needed to change itself the way Warren Buffet changed
Salomon. And that is where Andersen failed.
As Andersen negotiated with federal prosecutors in early
March 2002, it emphasized what it viewed as its "good corporate
citizen" response to the wrongdoing by its employees: it had
reported the wrongdoing itself; it had terminated the prime
culprit and was prepared to terminate others who had been
involved; it had produced 100,000 of pages of documents; its
158 See Jonathan Wel, Questioning the Books: Andersen Retains Volcker in
Effort to Boost Its Image, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2002, at A8.
159 See Brown et al., supra note 153, at Al.
160 See Alex Berenson & Jonathan D. Glater, A Tattered Andersen Fights for
Its Future, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, § 3, at 1 (noting that Andersen paid over
$100 million to settle lawsuits relating to its Sunbeam audits); Civil War Splits
Andersen, supra note 144, at 1 (recounting Andersen's role in the Waste
Management accounting fraud, for which Andersen paid the SEC a $7 million fine,
although without admitting fault).
161 See Kurt Eichenwald, Miscues, Missteps and the Fall of Andersen, N.Y.
TIMES, May 8, 2002, at Cl; Repeat Offender Gets Stiff Justice, supra note 144, at 1.
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executives had testified before Congress; it had hired an outside
law firm to conduct an internal investigation; and it was
prepared to continue fully cooperating. 162 .
Prosecutors, though, remained unconvinced of Andersen's
"good corporate citizenship" for two reasons. First, Andersen
was unwilling to admit that the wrongdoing extended beyond a
few employees in its Houston office. 163  In short, it was
unwilling to admit that it was at fault as an organization.
Second, and closely related, Andersen was unable to convince
prosecutors that it regarded the document destruction as
serious misconduct. 164 Both of these failings can be traced to
the fact that Andersen was negotiating with the prosecutors
without having changed its top management. To admit
organizational fault, to admit that things were fundamentally
wrong with Andersen's corporate ethos,16 5 Andersen's top
162 See Repeat Offender Gets Stiff Justice, supra note 144, at 1 (recounting
Andersen's arguments at the final meeting between Andersen and the Department
of Justice before Andersen was indicted); Richard B. Schmitt et al, Behind
Andersen's Tug of War With U.S. Prosecutors, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2002, at C1
(same).
163 See Letter from Richard J. Favretto, Mayer, Brown, Rowe. & Maw,
Attorneys for Arthur Andersen LLP, to Michael Chertoff, Assistant Attorney
General, U.S. Department of Justice (March 13, 2002), available at
http://www.fei.org/download/lettertojusticedepartment2.pdf (on file with author)
(arguing that "the expedited effort to destroy documents was confined to a
relatively few partners and employees of the firm and was almost entirely limited
to the Houston office").
164 See Repeat Offender Gets Stiff Justice, supra note 144, at 1 ("To
prosecutors, Andersen's idea of a resolution-indict a few bad auditors but not the
firm-was another example of its cavalier attitude. They were convinced the firm's
bosses were unrepentant, that they regarded civil penalties and promised reforms
as mere tolls to be paid on the road to ever-greater profits."); Eichenwald, supra
note 161, at C1 (noting that "the government had concerns that some at Andersen
did not appreciate how serious the matter was").
165 Indeed, the federal prosecutors were not the only observers to conclude that
Andersen's ethical problems ran deeper than a few partners and spread much
wider than its Houston office. A detailed examination of Andersen's rise and fall by
the Chicago Tribune, see supra note 144, traced Andersen's problems to a gradual
but persistent dilution of the firm's fabled ethos of independence and integrity:
Andersen's leaders have portrayed the firm as the innocent victim of
overzealous prosecutors and a dishonest client. But a close examination
of Andersen's collapse reveals a very different story. In the 1990s, the
firm embarked on a path that valued hefty fees ahead of bluntly honest
bookkeeping, eroding Andersen's good name. Andersen shunted aside
accountants who failed to adapt to the firm's new direction. In their place,
Andersen promoted a slicker breed who could turn modestly profitable
auditing assignments into consulting gold mines. Repeatedly, Andersen
rewarded those involved with the firm's most troubled clients, while
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managers would have had to admit their own fault and their
own failings. Not surprisingly, the "full cooperation" offered by
Andersen's top managers did not extend to cooperating against
themselves. As a result, Andersen was indicted for obstruction
of justice and the firm quickly fell apart. 166
In the weeks following its indictment, as Andersen
struggled to stay intact, it took some concrete steps toward
changing its character. Paul Volcker's independent board
proposed sweeping changes to the firm's structure,
management, and policies. 167 Joseph Berardino, the Managing
Partner and CEO, who had charted Andersen's response to the
Enron fiasco, resigned. 16 The firm even agreed to a deferred
prosecution, such as the one imposed on Prudential. 169 For
Andersen though, it was too little, too late. Even as plea
discussions continued in fits and starts over the next few
weeks, 170 the indictment had sealed the firm's fate. Before it
guardians of the company's legacy.., were shown the door. In an early-
90's purge, the new leaders forced out roughly one of every 10 auditing
partners and neutered Andersen's elite corps of in-house ethics
watchdogs, who for decades had been the firm's final word on accounting
matters large and small.
The Fall of Andersen, supra note 144, at 1; see also Jonathan D. Glater, Lone
Ranger Of Auditors Fell Slowly Out of Saddle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2002, at C1,
(reporting that "Andersen accountants and alumni" attribute the firm's ethical
failings not to "rogue accountants," but rather to "steadily increasing pressure to
bring in more revenue as competition grew" and as "clients became much more
aggressive, demanding that accountants sign off on results that supported frothy
stock prices").
166 See Robert Manor & Naftali Bendavid, Andersen to Cut Jobs As Many
Partners Flee, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 5, 2002, at 1 (reporting massive layoffs at Andersen
in the wake of its indictment); Schmitt et al., supra note 63 (reporting that
Andersen was indicted on March 7, 2002, although the indictment was not
announced until March 14).
167 Melita Marie Garza & Delroy Alexander, Volcker Plans 'New Andersen': Ex-
Fed Chief Seeks To Have Indictment, SEC Probe Dropped; Firm's Employees March
In Loop, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 23, 2002, at 1.
168 Tom Fowler, Andersen CEO to Step Down, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 27, 2002,
at 1.
169 See supra note 121 and accompanying text. Andersen first proposed
accepting a deferred prosecution in a March 13, 2002 letter to prosecutors-six
days after the indictment had been returned, but one day before it was unsealed.
See Andersen Letter, supra note 163.
170 See, e.g., Delroy Alexander & Robert Manor, Andersen Divided on Options;
Fight or Plead Scenarios Leave Partners At Odds, CHI. TRIB., April 12, 2002, at 1;
Eichenwald, supra note 161; Tom Fowler, Trial Likely As Government Rejects
Latest Andersen Bid, HOUS. CHRON. Apr. 26, 2002, at 3; Deferred Settlement in
Works, Sources Say, HOUS. CHRON., April 16, 2002, at 4; Richard B. Schmitt et al.,
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was convicted, 171 Andersen had all but ceased to exist.172
It is, of course, impossible to know whether Andersen would
have been able to avoid indictment by aggressively moving to
change its organizational character (or at least to change the
face of its organization). Andersen's effort to prove its "good
corporate citizenship" was also complicated by the fact that
Andersen is not a corporation at all, but a partnership. 173
Unlike Salomon, Kidder, and Prudential, Andersen did not have
an outside investor or parent company who could assume its
leadership and instantly give it a new face. But the steps
Andersen took after the indictment-particularly Berardino's
resignation and Volcker's willingness to assume control of the
firm-show that it was possible. By waiting until after the
indictment to take those steps, however, Andersen missed its
best chance to avoid the fate that befell it.
CONCLUSION
Not every corporation facing a criminal investigation must
shed its top management to survive.' 74 But for high-profile
companies faced with high-profile investigations, the lessons
from Andersen (and Kidder, Drexel, Solomon, Cooper,
Glitches Imperil Possible Deal For Andersen, WALL. ST. J., Apr. 17, 2002, at Cl;
Schmitt et al, supra note 162, at Cl.
171 Andersen was convicted of one count of obstruction of justice on June 15,
2002. See Kurt Eichenwald, Andersen Guilty in Effort to Block Inquiry on Enron,
N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 2002, at Al. Ironically, the jury's verdict may have been
based not on David Duncan's massive shredding operation, but on one document
that was not shredded, in which Andersen attorney Temple suggested that Duncan
revise a memo to eliminate the word "misleading" as a description of Enron's
accounting practices. See Repeat Offender Gets Stiff Justice, supra note 144, at 1.
That the jury's verdict may have indirectly vindicated Andersen's position on the
shredding only emphasizes that Andersen's fate rested on the indictment, not the
conviction. On October 16, 2002, Andersen was sentenced to a $500,000 fine and
five years probation. See Arthur Andersen is Fined $500,000, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17,
2002, at C3.
172 See Repeat Offender Gets Stiff Justice, supra note 144, at 1 ("In many ways,
[the trial] was a formality; all but dead, Andersen could do little but defend its
once-proud name.").
173 See Alexander & Manor, supra note 170, at 1 (recounting disagreements
among Andersen partners about whether the firm should plead guilty or fight the
charges).
174 Indeed, many corporations have avoided indictment-or survived
indictment-with top management intact. See Anup Agrawal et al., Management
Turnover and Governance Changes Following the Revelation of Fraud, 42 J.L. &
ECON. 309, 310 (1999) (citing examples).
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Prudential, and Daiwa) are stark. First, a corporation's best
hope to avoid indictment is to engage in "super cooperation"
that will convince prosecutors of its "good corporate citizenship."
Second, that "super cooperation" may be irrevocably hampered
if the firm does not quickly change its top management.
The dilemma for the corporation-and the paradox of
vicarious snitching-is that the people deciding whether and
how the corporation should cooperate are the very top managers
whose fates may be at issue. In a sense, Kidder, Solomon, and
Prudential were lucky to have a major shareholder or parent
company who could assume control of the cooperation and
ensure that top management was ousted. By contrast,
companies that are more closely controlled by corporate insiders
will find themselves institutionally restrained in their efforts to
provide the kind of effective cooperation that prosecutors
increasingly demand. As Andersen's demise vividly
demonstrates, that restraint can sometimes be fatal.
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